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abstRaCt: This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I (The constitutio-
nal systems of the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and 
Macau) introduces the readers to the historical background of Hong 
Kong and Macau and the “one country, two systems” constitutional 
orders in force in the Hong Kong and the Macau Special Administrative 
Regions of the People’s Republic of China. It also informs on the most 
relevant constitutional developments occurring in the first two decades 
of existence of these two special regions. Part II (Judicial cooperation 
in criminal matters in the Special Administrative Regions) explains how 
such constitutional orders influence the extant legal framework on 
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judicial cooperation in criminal matters, which applies to external 
cooperation with other states or territories, but not to cooperation 
between the different jurisdictions within China, for which there 
are no positive rules currently in force. This part surveys the rules 
in force in Hong Kong and Macau concerning the surrender of 
fugitives to other countries. Part III (The surrender of fugitives to 
Mainland China) focuses particularly on the issue of arrest and return 
of Chinese citizens from Hong Kong and Macau to Mainland China. 
It provides an overview of the cases that came to public attention 
and the legal conundrums created by the absence of “two systems” 
specific rules on surrender of fugitives within “one country”.
KeywoRds: Hong Kong; Macau; Mainland China; Surrender of Fu-
gitives; “One country, two systems”.
Resumo:	 Este	 artigo	divide-se	 em	 três	 partes.	A	Parte	 I	 (O	 sistema	
constitucional	das	Regiões	Administrativas	Especiais	de	Hong	Kong	e	Macau)	
fornece	o	enquadramento	histórico	das	Regiões	Administrativas	Especiais	
de	Hong	Kong	e	Macau	e	introduz	as	ordens	constitucionais	das	Regiões	
Administrativas	Especiais	de	Hong	Kong	e	Macau	da	República	Democrática	
da	China	existentes	à	luz	do	princípio	“um	país,	dois	sistemas”.	É	feita	uma	
referência	aos	principais	desenvolvimentos	constitucionais	ocorridos	nas	
primeiras	décadas	de	existências	dessas	regiões	administrativas	especiais.	A	
Parte	II	(Cooperação	judicial	em	matéria	criminal	nas	Regiões	Administrativas	
Especiais)	explica	como	é	que	as	referidas	ordens	constitucionais	influenciam	
o	quadro	jurídico	existente	relativo	à	cooperação	judicial	em	matéria	criminal,	
o	qual	se	aplica	à	cooperação	com	outros	Estados	ou	territórios,	mas	não	
à	cooperação	entre	as	várias	jurisdições	existentes	na	China,	cooperação	
esta	para	a	qual	não	existem	regras	positivadas	atualmente	em	vigor.	
Examinam-se	as	regras	em	vigor	em	Hong	Kong	e	em	Macau	sobre	a	entrega	
de	fugitivos	para	outros	países.	A	parte	III	(A	entrega	de	fugitivos	à	China	
continental)	lida	particularmente	com	a	questão	da	detenção	e	entrega	de	
cidadãos	chineses	de	Hong	Kong	e	Macau	à	China	continental.	Fornece	uma	
visão	geral	dos	casos	vindos	a	público	e	do	dilema	jurídico	criado	pela	falta	
de	regras	específicas	relativas	à	entrega	de	fugitivos	dentro	do	“um	país”.
PalavRas-Chave:	Hong	Kong;	Macau;	China	Continental;	Entrega	de	
Fugitivos;	“Um	país,	dois	sistemas”.
sumáRIo: Introduction; 1. The constitutional systems of the Special 
Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau; 2. Judicial cooper-
ation in criminal matters in the Special Administrative Regions; 3. The 
surrender of fugitives to Mainland China; Conclusion; References.
739https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v5i2.242 |
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, vol. 5, n. 2, p. 737-772, mai.-ago. 2019.
intRoduction
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I (The constitutional 
systems of the Special Administrative Regions of Hong Kong and Macau) 
introduces the readers to the historical background of Hong Kong and 
Macau and the “one country, two systems” constitutional orders in force 
in the Hong Kong and the Macau Special Administrative Regions of 
the People’s Republic of China. It also informs on the most relevant 
constitutional developments occurring in the first two decades of existence 
of these two special regions. Part II (Judicial cooperation in criminal matters 
in the Special Administrative Regions) explains how such constitutional 
orders influence the extant legal framework on judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, which applies to external cooperation with other states 
or territories, but not to cooperation between the different jurisdictions 
within China, for which there are no positive rules currently in force. 
This part surveys the rules in force in Hong Kong and Macau concerning 
the surrender of fugitives to other countries. Part III (The surrender of 
fugitives to Mainland China) focuses particularly on the issue of arrest 
and return of Chinese citizens from Hong Kong and Macau to Mainland 
China. It provides an overview of the cases that came to public attention 
and the legal conundrums created by the absence of “two systems” specific 
rules on surrender of fugitives within “one country”.
1.  thE constitutional systEMs of thE spEcial adMinistRativE 
REgions of hong Kong and Macau
The territories of Hong Kong and Macau were for a long time 
under the “sovereignty” or “exercise of sovereignty” of Great Britain 
and Portugal, until they were returned to the People’s Republic of China 
(hereinafter, PRC) in 1997 and 1999 respectively3.
3 In the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, while the PRC de-
clared that it would resume the “exercise of sovereignty” over Hong Kong, 
the United Kingdom declared it would “restore Hong Kong” to China. Joint 
Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, China-UK, Dec. 19, 1984, 1399 
U.N.T.S. 23,391, par. 1 and 2. In the Joint Declaration on the Question of 
Macau, the PRC and Portugal declared that “Macau […] is Chinese territory”. 
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In order to ensure the peaceful return of these territories to the 
“embrace of the motherland”4, the PRC concluded two international 
treaties, branded as Joint Declarations, with the United Kingdom 
and Portugal. The one most outstanding of commands of these Joint 
Declarations is, in short, “one country, two systems”. Half a year prior to 
the signing of the Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, Deng 
Xiaoping aptly unveiled the core of the separation of systems embodied 
in this unprecedented principle: while the one billion people from 
the Mainland “maintain” the socialist system, Hong Kong “continues” 
with its own system5. According to the twelfth basic policy of the two 
Joint Declarations,
Joint Declaration on the Question of Macau, China-Port., Mar. 22, 1988, 1498 
U.N.T.S. 25, 805, par. 1 (emphasis added).While this clause in the Joint Dec-
laration on the Question of Macau is the natural outcome of the fact that the 
Portuguese Constitution had for over a decade ‘given up’ sovereignty over 
Macau (on the Portuguese control over the territory as a “limited sovereign-
ty”, see PEREIRA, Francisco, Portugal, China e a “Questão De Macau”, Insti-
tuto Português do Oriente, 2nd Edition, p. 41-46), the “co-existence” of two 
clauses in the Joint Declaration on the question of Hong Kong is “a result of 
an agreement not to agree”. CHAN, Johannes, From Colony to Special Ad-
ministrative Region. Law Of The Hong Kong Constitution, edited by CHAN, 
Johannes SC (Hon) & LIM, C.L., Hong Kong, Thomson Reuters Hong Kong 
Limited trading as Sweet & Maxwell, 2015, p. 24. In fact, while the Portuguese 
Constitution recognized Macau as merely “under the administration” of Por-
tugal as far back as 1976 (see Article 5 (4) of the Portuguese Constitution of 
1976), the United Kingdom emphasized for longer its sovereign rights. The 
Hong Kong Act of 1985 only provided for the termination of British sov-
ereignty over Hong Kong as from 1 July 1997. On the whole “sovereignty” 
versus “exercise of sovereignty” issue, see LEMOS, Miguel Manero de, The 
Basic Laws of Hong Kong and Macau as Internationally Shaped Constitutions 
of China and the Fall Off of ‘One Country, Two Systems’, Tulane Journal of 
International and Comparative Law (Upcoming, March 2019), Part II.  
4 Thus, “end[ing] past humiliation and mark[ing] a major step forward to-
ward the complete reunification of China”. Chinese President Xi Jinping 
speech delivered at the meeting celebrating the 20th anniversary of Hong 
Kong’s return to the motherland, 1 July 2017. http://www.xinhuanet.com/
english/2017-07/01/c_136409940.htm.
5 XIAOPING, Deng, One Country, Two Systems, June 22-23, 1984. See 
Deng Xiaoping’s full remarks in https://dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.
com/2013/03/08/one-country-two-systems/. For a deeper understanding 
of how the separation of systems was idealized by Deng Xiaoping see the 
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“[twelve comprehensive] basic policies of the People’s Republic 
of China regarding Hong Kong [and Macau] and the elaboration 
of them in Annex I to [these] Joint Declaration[s] will be stip-
ulated, in […] Basic Law[s] of the Hong Kong and [the Macau] 
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China, by 
the National People’s Congress of the People’s Republic of China, 
and they will remain unchanged for 50 years”6.
Adopted around half a decade later, the Basic Laws of Hong 
Kong and Macau7, two “creative masterpieces” in the words of Deng,8 
are, at present, the two constitutional documents that govern the two 
Special Administrative Regions (hereinafter, SARs)9. They are premised 
upon the notion that “[t]he socialist system and policies shall not be 
practised in the […] Special Administrative Region[s], and the previous 
whole volume III of the Selected Works of Deng Xiaoping available at https://
dengxiaopingworks.wordpress.com/selected-works-vol-3-1982-1992/.
6 Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong, paragraph 3 (12) and Joint 
Declaration on the Question of Macau, para 2 (12) (emphasis added).
7 The Basic Laws are titled “Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region of the People’s Republic of China” and “Basic Law of the Macau 
Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China”. 
8 At the end of their task, the drafters of the Basic Law of Hong Kong were 
superbly complimented by Deng Xiaoping: “you have produced a law that 
is of historic and international significance. By historic I mean it is signif-
icant not only for the past and the present but also for the future. By in-
ternational and far-reaching I mean it is significant not only for the Third 
World but for all mankind. This document is a creative masterpiece”. Deng 
Xiaoping, Impromptu remarks to members of the Drafting Committee for 
the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region who were 
attending its Ninth Plenary Meeting. http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/
cpc2011/2010-09/15/content_12474319_5.htm.
9 Arguably, the most authoritative statement and analysis on the nature of the 
Basic Laws can be found in the Judgment Ng Ka Ling, where the Court of 
Final Appeal of Hong Kong considered, while emphasizing the purpose of 
the Basic Law of implementing the Joint Declaration, that “[t]he Basic Law is 
an entrenched constitutional instrument to implement the unique principle of 
‘one country, two systems’”. Ng Ka Ling and Another V. The Director of Immi-
gration [1999] HKCFA (29 January 1999) (hereinafter Ng Ka Ling (1)), par. 
73 (emphasis added).
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capitalist system and way of life shall remain unchanged for 50 years”10. 
According to the Basic Laws, 
“[the SARs] exercise a high degree of autonomy and enjoy execu-
tive, legislative and independent judicial power, including that of 
final adjudication”11. 
Although this high degree of autonomy does not extend to foreign 
and defence affairs, which lie within the responsibility of the Central 
People’s Government12, the Basic Laws, as explained throughout this Article, 
assign important powers in the domain of external affairs to the SARs.
The Basic Laws were adopted pursuant to Article 31 of the PRC’s 
most prominent constitutional document, the Constitution of the PRC, a 
socialist constitution. The PRC Constitution presides over the 1.3 billion 
people of the Mainland and also, possibly, at least in part, over the people 
of Hong Kong and Macau13.
In this tripartite unique constitutional arrangement – where three 
very different political, legal and judicial traditions coexist within “one 
country” and where separation encompasses hard-borders, different 
passports, different freedoms, different currencies, etc.14 – political, judicial 
10 HKBL, Article 5; MBL, Article 5 (emphasis added).
11 HKBL, Article 2; MBL, Article 2 (emphasis added).
12 HKBL, Articles 13 and 14; MBL, Articles 13 and 14.
13 Views on its applicability, on how such applicability occurs and on which norms 
of the PRC Constitution are actually applicable in the SARs vary. The “irony” 
inherent to the question is exemplified by the declaration of the members of 
the Basic Law Drafting Committee that the PRC Constitution “as a whole is 
applicable to [the SARs], but it does not mean that all is applicable”. FU H L, 
Supremacy of a Different Kind: The Constitution, the NPC, and the Hong Kong 
SAR, Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate, Conflict over Interpretation, CHAN, FU, 
GHAI (eds), Hong Kong University Press, 2000, p. 100. The general trend is to 
argue that the provisions of the PRC Constitution on the unity and integrity of 
the state, powers of the sovereign organs and national symbols apply. According 
to the first author of this Article, the PRC Constitution was not supposed to ap-
ply at all in the SARs. But such is an isolated view. On this, see LEMOS, Miguel 
Manero de, The Basic Laws of Hong Kong and Macau as Internationally Shaped 
Constitutions of China and the Fall Off of ‘One Country, Two Systems’, Tulane 
Journal of International and Comparative Law (Upcoming, March 2019). 
14 For an understanding of the whole SARs’ picture see, for example, the differ-
ent contributions in Law Of The Hong Kong Constitution, edited by CHAN, 
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and legal difficulties and tensions are inevitable. The interaction between 
the Central Authorities and the SARs is defined in the Basic Laws, most 
prominently in chapters entitled “[r]elationship between the Central 
Authorities and the […] Special Administrative Region[s]”, but also in 
many other provisions that one can find throughout the documents15. 
The “relationship” is not always delineated in a clear way. Such is not due 
to the carelessness of the drafters of the Basic Laws but to a deliberate 
ambiguity inherent to the complex ‘negotiation’ process that led to their 
adoption16. The intense, but at times unsuccessful, attempts to reconcile 
seemingly irreconcilable perspectives, and the need to attune what was 
agreed upon in the Joint Declarations with the political realities existing 
half a decade after these international treaties were concluded, have left 
no room for clear-cut solutions17.
Unsurprisingly, at least in hindsight, tensions at the political-
judicial level emerged early in the life of the first SAR, the Hong Kong 
SAR. An example of how difficult it is to reconcile the theoretical and 
legal separation of systems with reality on the ground, ‘irreconcilable’ 
views arose in a judicial case over the right of abode in Hong Kong of 
children born in Mainland China and whose father or mother had the 
right of abode in Hong Kong. For present purposes, it suffices to note that 
the Court of Final Appeal of Hong Kong (hereinafter, HKCFA) upheld 
such right in terms that were considered perilous by the Government 
of Hong Kong, namely because it could lead to an influx of roughly 1.6 
Johannes SC (Hon) & LIM, C.L., Hong Kong: Thomson Reuters Hong Kong 
Limited trading as Sweet & Maxwell, 2015.
15 Of particularly relevance are the articles on interpretation and amendment of 
the Basic Laws. HKBL, Articles 158 and 159; MBL, Articles 143 and 144.
16 On the process of drafting of the Basic Law of Hong Kong see, for example, 
CHAN, Johannes, From Colony to Special Administrative Region, p. 31 and 
32. Personal account of the early drafting history, and complexity inherent 
to the issue of interpretation of the Basic Law, in LEE, Martin, A Tale of Two 
Articles, The Basic Law and Hong Kong’s Future, ed. WESLEY-SMITH, Peter 
and CHEN, Albert H. Y., Hong Kong: Butterworths, 1988, p. 309-325. On the 
relatively less problematic process of drafting of the Basic Law of Macau, see 
PEREIRA, Francisco, Portugal, China e a “Questão de Macau, cit., p. 139-142.
17 On the influence that the Tiananmen incidents of 1989 might have had in the 
final solutions that were eventually ‘agreed upon’, see CHAN, Johannes, From 
Colony to Special Administrative Region, cit., p. 32, p. 1079. 
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million people from the Mainland over the period of a decade18. In line 
with such consideration, the Government of Hong Kong decided to 
ask for the help of the Central Authorities19. The Standing Committee 
of the National People’s Congress acceded to the request by issuing an 
interpretation of the Basic Law20 that reversed de iure and/or de facto the 
decision of the HKCFA21. This interpretation was adopted under, inter 
alia,22 Article 158 of the HKBL, which constitutes a perfect instance of 
the above mentioned deliberate ambiguity, in that it ‘peculiarly shares’, 
in no certain terms, interpretive power between the Central Authorities 
and the courts in Hong Kong23.
The case highlighted not only the physical reality of intense 
movement of people – and deeply shared bonds of life – between Hong 
Kong and the Mainland, but also the very different political and judicial 
18 https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/199905/18/0518159.htm.
19 See The Chief Executive’s Report to the State Council Concerning the Right 
of Abode, 20 May 1999.
20 The Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Con-
gress of Articles 22(4) and 24(2)(3) of the Basic Law of the Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region of the People’s Republic of China (Adopted at 
the Tenth Session of the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s 
Congress on 26 June 1999) (hereinafter Interpretation Ng Ka Ling).
21 For an extensive discussion of this interpretation, see Hong Kong’s Consti-
tutional Debate, Conflict over Interpretation, CHAN, FU, GHAI (eds), Hong 
Kong University Press, 2000.
22 The Standing Committee stated its interpretative power in the domain of the 
Basic Law is also grounded on Article 67 (4) PRC Constitution. On the per-
nicious effects of invoking the socialist provisions of the PRC Constitution in 
Hong Kong and Macau matters, see LEMOS, Miguel Manero de, Too late for 
the Standing Committee to take a “good faith” step back? And the possibility 
of the Court of Final Appeal to save “one country, two systems” by asserting 
its constitutional power of control over the actions of the Standing Commit-
tee, in BIAGI, Francesco, FROSINI, Justin O. and MAZZONE, Jason (eds.), 
Constitutional History: Comparative Perspectives (Brill forthcoming 2019).
23 On Article 158, see LING, Bing, Subject Matter Limitation on the NPCSC’s Pow-
er to Interpret the Basic Law, 37 Hong Kong Law Journal, 2007, arguing that 
the Standing Committee has no power to interpret provisions of the Basic Law 
which concern the autonomy of Hong Kong but accepting a proprio motu power 
of the Standing Committee to interpret other provisions. See also LEMOS, Mi-
guel Manero de, Too late for the Standing Committee to take a “good faith” step 
back? cit., arguing that no proprio motu power is provided for in the Basic Laws.
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traditions on the two sides of the hard-border. Having interpreted the 
provisions of the Basic Law at stake in one way and disposed of the case 
accordingly, the fiercely independent HKCFA even asserted, in Marbury 
vs Madison mode, its own authority to review the constitutionality of 
the acts of the most powerful organ of the PRC, the National People’s 
Congress (NPC)24. Reaction ‘on the Mainland side of the border’ was 
robust25 and the standoff with the Central Authorities ended with a kind 
of silent compromise, according to which the concurrent ‘final authority’ 
of the two organs to interpret the Basic Law was upheld, with unspoken 
prominence assigned to the Standing Committee. Since then, the courts 
in Hong Kong have adopted a “soft controls” approach in order to avoid 
another direct confrontation26.
Not long after, in 2003, tensions surfaced again at the political-
societal level over the question of implementation of a law on national 
security as constitutionally instructed by Article 23 of the Basic Law, 
which provides that
“[t]he […] Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its 
own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion 
against the Central People’s Government, or theft of state secrets, to 
prohibit foreign political organizations or bodies from conducting 
24 Ng Ka Ling (1), par. 64, 65.
25 The Mainland scholarly reaction to the assertion of the HKCFA is one ex-
ample. See WEIYUN, Xiao and others, Why the Court of Final Appeal Was 
Wrong: Comments of the Mainland Scholars on the Judgment of the Court 
of Final Appeal, in Hong Kong’s Constitutional Debate, Conflict over Interpre-
tation, CHAN, FU, GHAI (eds), Hong Kong University Press, 2000, p. 55 and 
56: “the judgment which said that the CFA could review whether a decision 
of the NPC Standing Committee was consistent with the Basic Law was pa-
tently wrong” (opinion of Xiao Weiyun, emphasis added); the circumstance 
that the jurisdiction of the CFA is, in nature, that of a sovereign power was 
considered “ridiculous” (opinion of Shao Tianren).  
26 See its efforts to find innovative confront-avoidance devices, for example, in 
Ng Ka Ling & Others v. Director of Immigration (No 2), 26 February 1999; 
HKSAR v. Ng Kung Siu, (1999) 2 HKCFAR 442; Director of Immigration, v. 
Chong Fung Yuen, [2001] HKCFA 48), See also Benny Tai, ‘The Judiciary’, in 
Contemporary Hong Kong Government and Politics, Expanded Second Edi-
tion, eds WAI-MAN, Lam, LUI, Percy Luen-tim, Wilson Wong, (Hong Kong 
University Press, 2012), (n. 86) 77-8.
746 | LEMOS; ROBALO.
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, vol. 5, n. 2, p. 737-772, mai.-ago. 2019.
political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organi-
zations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign 
political organizations or bodies”27.
Implementation roundly failed28 and, in the following year, 
controversy arose again in relation to constitutional development on 
the question of universal suffrage29, highlighting the different views 
over the pace of democratization that is desired by many in Hong Kong 
and the one that is found more adequate by the Central Authorities. 
In the face of another ambiguous provision of the Basic Law over 
who has the initiative to start the process for amending the rules for 
selecting the Chief Executive of the SAR and electing its Legislative 
Assembly30, the Standing Committee issued its second interpretation31 
27 Article 23 of the Basic Laws.
28 Consider the following account in GITTINGS, Danny, Introduction to the Ba-
sic Law, Hong Kong Univ. Press 2013, p. 106: “an extreme example of this 
came during more than 180 hours of scrutiny by the Legislative Council of 
the National Security (Legislative Provisions) Bill in early 2003. This con-
troversial bill primarily sought to implement the requirement in Article 23 
[…]. But it aroused so much opposition during the legislative process that 
the government was forced to table three revised versions of the bill and 51 
amendments, some making major changes to its original proposals. Howev-
er, all these changes failed to appease the bill’s critics. Instead, the highly 
publicized process of legislative scrutiny arguably only intensified public 
opposition. As a result, after a massive street protest by more than half a 
million people on 1 July 2003, legislators who had previously promised to 
support the bill changed their minds. Lacking enough support in the Legis-
lative Council to secure its enactment, the executive was left with no choice 
but to withdraw the bill just days before it was due to be put to a vote”.
29 According to the Basic Law of Hong Kong the “ultimate aim[s]” are “the se-
lection of the Chief Executive by universal suffrage upon nomination by a 
broadly representative nominating committee in accordance with democrat-
ic procedures” and “the election of all the members of the Legislative Council 
by universal suffrage”. HKBL, Articles 45 and 68. 
30 See Annexes I and II of the Basic Laws. 
31 The Interpretation by the Standing Committee of the National People’s 
Congress of Article 7 of Annex I and Article III of Annex II to the Basic Law 
of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the People’s Republic 
of China (Adopted at the Eighth Session of the Standing Committee of the 
Tenth National People’s Congress on 6 April 2004). 
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and effectively took control of the whole process of changes in the 
electoral system32.
The situation seemed calm for almost a decade, but the recent 
‘Occupy Central standoff’, where tens of thousands occupied Central 
Hong Kong for months, has highlighted that, after two decades of the 
return of Hong Kong to the PRC, “one country, two systems” is still being 
finely shaped ‘as we go’. On the aftermath of the standoff, the Standing 
Committee intervened again by issuing another interpretation. In this 
2016 interpretation, the provision of the Basic Law at stake related to the 
taking of oath by public officials. As a result of the interpretation, two 
directly elected representatives, who flirt with the idea of independence 
for Hong Kong, were disqualified from their seats in the Legislative 
Council. While taking the oath of office, the two youngsters pledged 
allegiance to the “two systems” part of the oath but fudged the part relating 
to “one country”. Also somewhat as a consequence of the standoff, the 
most recent constitutional move by the Standing Committee consisted 
of adding the national anthem law to Annex III of the Basic Law. It is not 
legally clear, as of yet, whether this law creates an obligation for Hong 
Kong to criminalize acts that correspond to a legitimate exercise of the 
freedom of expression, at least as this freedom was understood within 
the previous “way of life” that is to be maintained for 50 years33.
All these developments have been shaped by the complex 
dynamics of the relationship between, on the one hand, the forces for 
democratization and the courts in Hong Kong, particularly, the HKCFA 
and, on the other hand, the Central Authorities, a prominent legal 
and precision guided role being exercised by the Standing Committee 
and its interpretations34. The constitutional picture is that of a bizarre 
32 On this interpretation, see DAVIS, Michael, Interpreting Constitutionalism 
and Democratization in Hong Kong, Interpreting Hong Kong’s Basic Law: The 
Struggle For Coherence, FU, Hualing, HARRIS, Lison and YOUNG, Simon 
N.M. (eds.), Palgrave, 2007, p. 79-81.
33 The decision to add the National Anthem Law to Annex III was made on 4 
November 2017.
34 In fact, although – in relation to issues that the  Standing Committee per-
ceives to be “one country” issues – the intervention by the center has been 
robust, it is remarkable how “very cautiously” the Standing Committee has 
been exercising its power and it is definitively true that, at least in relation to 
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mesh of different interpretative techniques, decision-making habits 
and ‘policy oriented versus rule of law oriented decisions’, all of which 
supposedly producing legal effects within the same jurisdiction. The 
result is a constitutional system with overlapping layers and operating 
logics that, possibly, are an inevitable and already ingrained part of 
“one country, two systems”.
In Macau, a smaller, and less unruly, territory, things are less 
rowdy35. In fact, clashes between the institutions of the Macau SAR and 
the Central Authorities are unheard of. Two major factors explain the 
Macanese reality. First, unlike in the case of Hong Kong, there are no 
provisions in the Macau Basic Law mandating a progressive development 
towards universal suffrage36. Second, courts in Macau do not normally 
assert the same type of constitutional authority as their Hong Kong 
counterparts do37.
uncontroversial autonomic matters, in which the “larger China” is clearly not 
an interested party, the Standing Committee and other Central Authorities 
have let Hong Kong’s autonomy work on its own. GITTINGS, Danny, Intro-
duction To The Hong Kong Basic Law, 2nd Edition, Hong Kong University 
Press, 2016, p. 6 and 310.
35 Of note is that, unlike the case of Hong Kong, Macau passed a Law on Na-
tional Security smoothly, as mandated by Article 23 of the Basic Laws. Also 
of note is that a Member recently elected to the Legislative Assembly of Ma-
cau was suspended from office by his peers as a result of pending criminal 
proceedings for (illegally) disobeying police orders during a demonstration. 
Upon a (relatively reduced) sentence of 120-day fine, amounting to about 
5000 US dollars, the young legislator has since retaken his seat in the territo-
ry’s legislative body.
36 Provisions merely establish the possibility of altering the method of selecting 
the Chief Executive and the method for forming the Legislative Assembly. 
See Annex I and II MBL. 
37 Compare the following statement of the HKCFA, “[l]ike other constitutions, 
[the Basic Law] distributes and delimits powers, as well as providing for fun-
damental rights and freedoms. As with other constitutions, laws which are in-
consistent with the Basic Law are of no effect and are invalid. Under it, the courts 
of the Region have independent judicial power within the high degree of au-
tonomy conferred on the Region” (HKCFA, LING, Ng Ka, par. 64 (emphasis 
added)) with this one of the Macau CFA: “[a]lthough the Basic Law of Macau 
shares the characteristics normally associated with the political constitutions 
of states, formally it is not a constitution because the Macau SAR is not a State”. 
See Tribunal de Última Instância, Case n. 28/2006, 18 July 2007 (emphasis 
added). Examples of deference of courts in Macau to ordinary legislation 
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2.  Judicial coopERation in cRiMinal MattERs in thE spEcial 
adMinistRativE REgions
As explained in Part I, the proper operation of “one country, two 
systems” is rather complex. Judicial cooperation in criminal matters is no 
exception and, arguably, is a textbook illustration of how such complexity 
translates into a perplexing state of affairs. The Basic Laws enshrine a 
slightly enigmatic norm on how judicial cooperation tout court might take 
place between each of the SARs and other parts of the country. According 
to Articles 95 HKBL and 93 MBL 
“[t]he Special Administrative Region[s] may, through consultations 
and in accordance with law, maintain juridical relations with the 
judicial organs of other parts of the country, and they may render 
assistance to each other”38. 
There are no news of these provisions ever being used as grounds 
for a specific case of judicial cooperation in criminal matters, namely, 
for the surrender of fugitives39. Scholars and others have since long 
in detriment of constitutional norms can be found in LEMOS Miguel, “Os 
‘crimes incaucionáveis’ no Código de Processo Penal de Macau”, Estudos em 
Homenagem ao prof. Doutor Manuel da Costa Andrade, Volume II, Studia Iurid-
ica, Universidade de Coimbra, Maio, 2018; LEMOS, Miguel, Direitos Funda-
mentais e Processo Penal: o Habeas Corpus, o Direito ao Recurso de Decisão 
Condenatória e as Funções de Tutela de Direitos Fundamentais do Tribunal 
de Instrução Criminal, Segundas Jornadas de Direito e Cidadania da Assembleia 
Legislativa da RAEM, Direitos Fundamentais – Consolidação e Perspectivas de 
Evolução, Coord. ALVES, Leonel e CARDINAL, Paulo, 2016, p. 257-267. Not-
withstanding, as explained in Part III, in some cases, courts in Macau have 
asserted a robust, but perhaps ineffective, type of constitutional authority.
38 See Articles 95 HKBL and 93 MBL (emphasis added). On the term “juridical”, 
see BRABYN, Janice M., Extradition and the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region, Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law, 20, 1988, p. 171, 172.
39 This Article will focus only on this specific aspect of judicial cooperation in 
criminal matters, which is not only the most symbolic aspect of this type of 
cooperation but also the one that has raised more controversy in Hong Kong 
and Macau. Legislation in Hong Kong on judicial cooperation in criminal mat-
ters tout court includes the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance (FOO); the Transfer 
of Sentenced Persons Ordinance and the Mutual Legal Assistance Ordinance 
(including ‘assistance in relation to the taking of evidence and the production 
of Things’, ‘assistance in relation to search and seizure’, ‘assistance in relation 
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argued that the legal and political solution for the impasse thus created 
is in the adoption of agreements between the SARs and the Mainland40. 
Although news of on-going conversations between the SARs and the 
Central Authorities on these agreements are recurrent, none has seen 
the light of day yet41. As a result, cooperation between the SARs and the 
Mainland has been left in a legal limbo. As further developed in Part III, 
this has led to interesting legal questions and peculiar decisions by courts.
to production etc. of material’, ‘transfer of persons to give assistance in relation 
to criminal matters’, ‘assistance in relation to confiscation, etc. of proceeds of 
crime’ and ‘service/certification of documents’); the Drug Trafficking (Re-
covery of Proceeds) Ordinance 1986; and Hong Kong Evidence Ordinance. 
BRABYN, Janice, Inter-jurisdictional Co-operation in Criminal Matters: Extra-
dition, Mutual Legal Assistance, Prisoner Transfer to and From the HKSAR, 
in WACKS, R. (ed), The New Legal Order in Hong Kong, Hong Kong: Hong 
Kong University Press, 1999, p. 149-156 (on cooperation with the Mainland, 
see ibidem, p. 157-159). In Macau, the applicable main piece of legislation is 
Law 6/2006, on judicial cooperation in criminal matters. According to Law 
6/2006, judicial cooperation in criminal matters encompasses the surrender 
of fugitives, transfer of proceedings, execution of criminal penalties, transfer 
of sentenced persons, surveillance of sentenced persons or persons on parole 
and other forms of judicial cooperation in criminal matters.
40 The use of the expression “the Special Administrative Region[s] may”, which 
logically also implies “may not”, surely reinforces the argument that the 
adoption of some sort of negotiated agreements between the Mainland and 
the SARs to regulate judicial cooperation in criminal matters is not excluded 
from the scope of the provision. On this see BINGZHI, Zhao, Estudo dobre a 
questão da cooperação judiciária em matéria penal entre o interior da China 
e as Regiões Administrativas Especiais de Hong Kong e de Macau, Revista 
Jurídica de Macau, número especial, 2004, p. 74-80, particularly, p. 79-80; As 
of today, it seems settled that the most appropriate method to deal with the 
issue is through negotiated agreements or arrangements between the Central 
Authorities and the SARs. Of note is that several arrangements were already 
made and are in force between the two SARs. On criminal matters, see Ar-
rangement between the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region and the Government of the Macau Special Administrative Region on the 
Transfer of Sentenced Persons, signed in Hong Kong on 20.5.2005 and Cooper-
ative Arrangement between Correctional Services Department of the Hong Kong 
Special Administrative Region and Macao Prison of the Macao Special Adminis-
trative Region, signed in Macao on 29.3.2006. On these agreements and trans-
fer of sentenced persons within the PRC in general, see WAN, Choy Dick, 
Prisoner Transfer between Hong Kong and Mainland China: A Preliminary 
Assessment, Brooklyn Journal of International Law, 2008, p. 500-501.
41 On why the conclusion of these agreements has proved so difficult, see Part. III.
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In contrast, judicial cooperation in criminal matters between 
the SARs and foreign countries runs quite smoothly42 under the normal 
principles applicable to judicial cooperation in criminal matters. In general, 
under a broad authorization of the Central People’s Government for the 
SARs “to conduct relevant external affairs on [their] own in accordance 
with [the Basic Laws]”43, this cooperation is conducted by the SARs’ 
Governments pursuant to their powers “to maintain and develop relations 
and conclude and implement agreements with foreign states”44. In particular, 
such cooperation is conducted, “with the assistance or authorization 
of the Central People’s Government”, in order to “make appropriate 
arrangements with foreign states for reciprocal juridical assistance”45.
Several such arrangements have been concluded and “have taken 
the form of either bilateral agreements46 or multilateral conventions47 
that are applied [in the SARs]”48.
42 This conclusion is subject to a more careful assessment, which cannot be car-
ried out in this Article, of the Snowden case. On this case, see KIELSGARD, 
Mark D. and IP, Ken Gee-Kin, Hong Kong’s Failure To Extradite Edward 
Snowden: More Than Just A Technical Defect, 13 Rich. J. Global L. & Bus 49, 
Spring, 2014, arguing that extradition from Hong Kong to the United States 
would probably not have been granted by Hong Kong courts if Snowden had 
remained in Hong Kong.
43 HKBL 13, MBL, 13.
44 HKBL 151, MBL 136 (emphasis added).
45 HKBL 96, MBL 94.
46 The Government of the HKSAR has so far signed agreements with twenty 
jurisdictions on the surrender of fugitive offenders. For a list of List of Sur-
render of Fugitive Offenders Agreements in Hong Kong see https://www.
doj.gov.hk/eng/laws/table4ti.html. It has also signed agreements on mutu-
al legal assistance in criminal matters with thirty-two foreign jurisdictions. 
https://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/201806/20/P2018062000419.htm. 
For the less extensive list of agreements on judicial cooperation in criminal 
matters in force in Macau, see https://www.io.gov.mo/pt/legis/int/list/
bilat/juridical.
47 In Hong Kong, several multilateral treaties containing obligations regarding 
surrender of fugitives and “requiring enabling legislation especially given 
their extraterritorial application” apply. LIM, C.L. & MUSHKAT, R., External 
Affairs, in CHAN, J.M.M. Chan & LIM, C.L. (eds), Law of the Hong Kong Con-
stitution, 2nd ed (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell, 2015),p., p. 112, marg. 3087, 
n. 120. For Macau, see https://www.io.gov.mo/pt/legis/int/list/multi/crime.
48 LIM, C.L. & MUSHKAT, R., External Affairs cit., p., p. 112, marg. 3087.
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The constitutional, international and legal framework applicable to 
the surrender of fugitives between the SARs and foreign states is vast and 
mostly raises the same legal questions as in other places in the world. It 
suffices to provide an overview of the main principles applicable in each of 
the SARs, which can be found in the two main pieces of legislation relevant 
to the matter: in Hong Kong, the above-mentioned Fugitive Offenders 
Ordinance (Cap. 503) and, in Macau, the above-mentioned Law 6/2006. 
The process of the surrender of fugitives is executed in both SARs by 
means of decisions of the Chief Executives49 and courts50. Notification of 
the process to the Central People’s Government is required51.
According to prevailing opinion such arrangements, laws and 
decisions “have largely followed […] international practice, in terms of 
both the conditions set out for the surrender of fugitive offenders and 
the required safeguards”52.
49 Section III of the FOO, in Hong Kong, and Article 22 Law 6/2006, in Macau. 
See also Articles 48 (9) HKBL and 50 (13) MBL (“the Chief Executive[s] of 
the […] Special Administrative Region[s] shall […] conduct, on behalf of the 
Government[s] of the Special Administrative Region[s], external affairs and 
other affairs as authorized by the Central Authorities”) and Articles 62 (3) 
HKBL and 64 (3) MBL (“[t]he Government[s] of the […] Special Administra-
tive Region[s] shall […] conduct external affairs as authorized by the Central 
People’s Government under this Law”)
50 On the procedure, in Hong Kong, see FOO, Sections 6-16. For a summary 
in the Macau case, see FERREIRA, Ilda Cristina, The Surrender of Fugitives 
offenders in Macao SAR, 2016, p. 307, 308.
51 See, in Hong Kong, Section 24 of the FOO and, in Macau, Law 3/2002. The 
Central People’s Government may issue instructions to the Chief Executive 
of the SARs “to take, or not to take, an action”. See particularly Section 24 (3) 
FOO and Article 4 Law 3/2002. See also Articles 48 (8) HKBL and 50 (12) MBL 
(“the Chief Executive[s] of the […] Special Administrative Region[s] shall […]
implement the directives issued by the Central People’s Government in respect 
of the relevant matters provided for in this Law”). Such is a consequence of the 
circumstance that the Central People’s Government is the responsible body 
for all matters affecting foreign affairs and defense. See KIELSGARD, Mark 
D. and IP, Ken Gee-Kin, Hong Kong’s Failure To Extradite Edward Snowden, 
cit., p. 52, informing that “Hong Kong has traditionally exercised its authori-
ty without interference from the Central Government [and that] there is no 
credible evidence suggesting that the [Central government] has ever directly 
overridden the Hong Kong Courts on extradition issues in the past”.
52 LIM, C.L. & MUSHKAT, R., External Affairs cit., p. 112, marg. 3087 (speaking 
of the Hong Kong case). See also FERREIRA, Ilda Cristina, The Surrender of 
753https://doi.org/10.22197/rbdpp.v5i2.242 |
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, vol. 5, n. 2, p. 737-772, mai.-ago. 2019.
As to the substantive conditions required for cooperation to 
proceed, one can find some normal rules on the matter that are common 
to both SARs, including ‘double criminality’53, ‘speciality’ and ‘no re-
surrender to a third jurisdiction’54, ‘non bis in idem’55, ‘no political 
offences’56, ‘no discrimination’57,  and ‘no surrender if death penalty’.58
Some differences do exist. Below are just some examples.
Under the influence of Portuguese law, the same legal framework 
that applies in both jurisdictions to ‘no surrender if death penalty’59 applies 
in Macau (but not in Hong Kong) to life imprisonment and to penalties 
of indefinite duration60.
Under the influence of British law, there is in Hong Kong the 
requirement that a ‘prima facie case [be made] on the face of available 
evidence’61. Although such a safeguard does not exist under Law 6/2006 
in Macau, which actually prohibits such an undertaking62, there is room 
for the Chief Executive of Macau to refuse cooperation when the manifest 
insufficiency of evidence would make cooperation contravene the 
international public order of the PRC and/or of the Macau SAR63.
Fugitives offenders in Macao SAR cit., p. 303 (speaking of the Macau case).
53 Minimum requirement of: more than 12 months (Hong Kong); not below one 
year (Macau). See Foo, Section 2 (2) and Law 6/2006, Article 32 (2).
54 See, for Hong Kong, Section 5 (2) to (7) FOOO. For Macau, see 46 (3) Law 
6/2006.  
55 Section 5 (1) e FOO; 9 and 20 Law 6/2006.  
56 5(1) a FOO; Article 8 Law 6/2006.
57 Section 5 (1) c, d FOO; Article 7 (1) 2 Law 6/2006.
58 No extradition if death penalty or if no assurances it will not be imposed or 
executed. Section 13 (5) FOO; Article 7 (1) 7 and 7 (2) 1 and 2 of Law 6/2006. 
59 See footnote 56.
60 Article 7 (1) 6 and 7 (2) 1 and 2 of Law 6/2006.
61 Section 10 (6) b iii of the FOO. (“the evidence in relation to the offence 
would be sufficient to warrant the person’s committal for trial according to 
the law of Hong Kong if the offence had been committed within the jurisdic-
tion of that court or any other court”). 
62 Article 48 (3) Law 6/2006 (“no evidence whatsoever is admitted on the facts 
alleged against the person”).
63 Article 48 (2) Law 6/2006 (“[t]he administrative phase is of the responsibil-
ity of the Chief Executive and is intended to assess whether the request for 
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Similarly, “in line with the practice in common law jurisdictions 
not to refuse surrender of own nationals, the Government [of Hong Kong 
does] not refuse to surrender nationals of China or Hong Kong Permanent 
Residents”64, albeit Section 13 (4) of the FOO provides for the “right to 
refuse the surrender of Chinese nationals”. Apparently, this provision has
“so far not been invoked and was intended to be used very rarely. 
The main reason for such a provision in surrender of agreements for 
the surrender of fugitive offenders was to cover a situation in future 
where arrangements existed to permit the rendition of persons 
from HKSAR to the Mainland, and both PRC and the requesting 
foreign jurisdiction had jurisdiction concurrently over the same 
offence. Such a provision would enable priority to be given to a 
Mainland request for the rendition of a Mainland Chinese national 
over a foreign request for the extradition of the same person for 
the same offence”65.
In Macau, in line with Portuguese and continental law practice, 
surrender is refused if the person is (1) a Chinese national non-resident 
of Macau or (2) a resident of Macau66. Interestingly, the principle aut 
dedere aut judicare only seems to apply to the latter case; not to the 
former. It seems that the rationale of the norm consists of the following: 
while the resident of Macau must be prosecuted in Macau, the Chinese 
surrender of a fugitive […] should be declared inadmissible for reasons of po-
litical order or opportunity or convenience”). On this see COSTA, Miguel João, 
Dedere aut judicare? A decisão de extraditar ou julgar à luz do direito português, 
europeu e internacional, Instituto Jurídico da Faculdade de Direito da Universi-
dade de Coimbra, Junho 2014, p. 27, 28, reasoning on the Portuguese law on 
cooperation and arguing that in such cases there is a duty for the Government, 
and even for the judiciary, to refuse cooperation. See also DIAS, Jorge de Figue-
iredo, Algumas questões em tema de extradição e de sede do crime [anotação], 
Revista de Legislação e Jurisprudência,118 (1985), p. 15 and ff.
64 LIM, C.L. & MUSHKAT, R., External Affairs cit., p. marg. 3087, n. 123.
65 Subcommittee on Fugitive Offenders (Finland) Order Background brief 
prepared by the Legislative Council Secretariat. https://www.legco.gov.hk/
yr05-06/english/hc/sub_leg/sc53/papers/sc530306cb2-1290-2e.pdf.
66 Article 33 (1) 2 and 3 Law 6/2006. In the case of a resident of the Macao SAR 
an exception exists if the request is made by the state of the persons’ nation-
ality or when the obligation to surrender flows from a self-executing norm in 
a treaty applicable to Macau.
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national non-resident of Macau must be surrendered for prosecution to 
the authorities of the Mainland, which would then be under the obligation to 
prosecute the person. Arguably – taking into account that there is a legal 
vacuum on the question of surrender of fugitives to the Mainland and, 
hence, such surrender is illegal67 – there is a loophole in Law 6/2006, as 
the person turns out to be subject neither to surrender to the Mainland 
nor to prosecution in Macau68.
In relation to ‘convictions in absentia’, surrender is automatically 
denied by the Hong Kong authorities if “the person (A) has not had 
an opportunity of being tried in his presence for that offence; and (B) 
if surrendered, would not have an opportunity of being re-tried in his 
presence for that offence”69. In Macau, apparently, such denial is not 
automatic, albeit there is the possibility for cooperation not to proceed 
if “[c]opy of the legal texts relating to the possibility of appealing the 
decision or retrial, [if conviction in absentia]” is not provided70.
Although there are some important differences, the overall 
resemblance between the constitutional, international and legal 
frameworks of the two SARs on this issue is relatively high. Therefore, it 
is not hard to predict that, if they ever see the light of day, the cooperation 
agreements to be established between each of them and the Mainland 
will be similar71, irrespective of whether or not many, or some, of these 
rules are suitable to, or will actually apply to, the future “one country, 
two systems” surrender of fugitives cooperation72.
67 See decisions of the Court of Final appeal of Macau below Part III.
68 On this, see LEMOS, Miguel, “Direitos Fundamentais e Processo Penal: o Ha-
beas Corpus”, cit., p. 265. See also Part III.
69 5 (1) b ii of the FOO.
70 See Articles 46 (2) 6, 47 and 48 of Law 6/2006. 
71 See also BINGZHI, Zhao, “Estudo dobre a questão da cooperação judiciária 
em matéria penal”, cit., p. 46-47.
72 Note, however, that this does not mean that the rules to be included in such 
agreements have to follow closely the substantive or procedural rules of inter-
national cooperation on judicial matters currently in force in the SARs. Pos-
sibly having this in mind, the HKSAR Security Bureau has already suggested 
that the “usual safeguards” included in the legislation of Hong Kong would 
be merely “of useful reference”, thereby hinting that there is no “legal obli-
gation to include these safeguards” in future agreements. See YEE, Marsha 
756 | LEMOS; ROBALO.
Rev. Bras. de Direito Processual Penal, Porto Alegre, vol. 5, n. 2, p. 737-772, mai.-ago. 2019.
3. thE suRREndER of fugitivEs to Mainland china
By definition, surrender of fugitives within the PRC is not a 
question of international judicial cooperation in criminal matters but of 
internal judicial cooperation. The legally complex problem lies in that very 
unalike constitutional documents and laws govern the Mainland and SARs. 
Thus, under the uniqueness of “one country, two systems” described in 
Part I, the framework for cooperation on surrender of fugitives that one 
day might take shape between the Mainland and the SARs will certainly 
be rather sui generis73.
Indeed, the main difficulty on the conclusion of a general 
agreement on judicial cooperation on criminal matters lies, more than 
anything else, in the issue of surrender of fugitives. The nature of the 
difficulty was well depicted by Margaret Ng. While the government of 
Wellknown, Hong Kong’s legal obligation to require fair trial for rendition, 
102 Colum. L. Rev. 1373, June, 2002, p. 1383. That is certainly true, as long as 
the rules of Basic Laws of the SARs are respected. The fact that Articles 95 
HKBL and 93 MBL are also constitutional rules does not mean that unlimited 
leeway for any type of cooperation whatsoever is to be deemed in accordance 
with the Basic Laws. See also GUOQIANG, Zhao, Auxílio judiciário mútuo 
inter-regional na China sob as condições de ‘um país, dois sistemas’, Revista 
Jurídica de Macau, Nº Especial, 2004, p. 105-109. In other words, Articles 95 
HKBL and 93 MBL have to be interpreted in harmony with the other rules 
of the Basic Laws, including the constitutional rules of international origin 
that have constitutional force in the SARs, most prominently the rules of 
the ICCPR, whose constitutional rank in the SARs derives from Article 39 
HKBL and 40 MBL. Similarly, special attention must be paid to the funda-
mental aspects of the law previously in force in Hong Kong and Macau. See 
Joint Declaration on the question of Hong Kong, par. 3 (3), and Joint Decla-
ration on the question of Macau, par. 2 (4): “the fundamentals of the law cur-
rently in force in Hong Kong [and Macau] will remain basically unchanged”. 
This wording flows from the Chinese version of the Joint Declarations 
(“现行的法律基本不变”). Less accurately, the English and Portuguese ver-
sions state that [t]he laws currently in force in Hong Kong [and Macau] will 
remain basically unchanged”. Of course, not all the laws will remain basical-
ly unchanged; laws can be even revoked. What should remain basically un-
changed are the fundamentals aspects of the legal system previously in force.
73 On two grounds for refusal that might prove controversial in the Main-
land-SARs context, namely the “death penalty” and “political offence” ex-
ceptions, see BRABYN, Janice, Inter-jurisdictional Co-operation in Criminal 
Matters cit. p. 160.
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Hong Kong affirmed that dual criminality would be a requirement to be 
included in any such agreement, Ng put forward that:
“this sort of safeguard will not be good enough for the realities of 
a Mainland-HKSAR agreement, because the problem here lies in 
the two extremely different legal and judicial systems, particularly 
relating to the recognition of fundamental rights, including the right 
to an open and fair trial. Hence the bottom line for the negotiation 
for a rendition agreement must be no rendition of any person from 
Hong Kong without guarantee for his rights, including the right 
of an open and fair trial by international human rights standards. 
One can see the difficulty of the HKSAR government officials in 
putting forward a position which acknowledges a deep mistrust 
in the mainland system. It is probably far too impolite to speak 
the truth. However, until and unless this problem is overcome, 
Hong Kong will not be better off with a rendition agreement”74.
And thus, as agreements and/or laws setting up the general legal 
framework governing these cases have yet to be concluded or enacted, 
one could be led to think that internal cooperation for the arrest and 
surrender of fugitives between the SARs and the Mainland is stalled. In 
other words, the absence of specific norms on how to restrict the cons-
titutional “inviolable freedom” of persons75 for the purpose of arrest and 
74 LO, Shiu Hing, The Politics of Cross-Border Crime in Greater China: Case 
Studies of Mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macao (Hong Kong Becoming 
China), (East Gate, 2009), p. 182 (emphasis added). On requiring fair trial 
for rendition, see YEE, Marsha Wellknown, Hong Kong’s legal obligation to 
require fair trial for rendition cit.
75 In the SARs, relevant constitutional norms include Article 28 HKBL and 
MBL (“[t]he freedom of the person of […] residents shall be inviolable. No 
[…] resident shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful arrest, detention or 
imprisonment. Arbitrary or unlawful […] deprivation or restriction of the 
freedom of the person shall be prohibited”); Article 31 HKBL and Article 33 
MBL (“[u]nless restrained by law, holders of valid travel documents shall be 
free to leave the Region without special authorization”); Article 39 HKBL and 
Article 40 MBL(“[t]he rights and freedoms enjoyed by […] residents shall not 
be restricted unless as prescribed by law”) (emphasis added); Article 41 HKBL 
and Article 43 MBL(“[p]ersons in the […] Special Administrative Region[s] 
other than […] residents shall, in accordance with law, enjoy the rights and 
freedoms of […] residents”). See also Articles 9, 12 and 13 of the ICCPR.
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surrender of fugitives within different jurisdictions of the PRC would 
constitute an unsurmountable obstacle to cooperation on this matter76.
Reality is a bit more complex. On the one hand, the alleged 
mistrust has long only worked one-way. From the Mainland side of the 
border, authorities have frequently surrendered back to Hong Kong and 
Macau fugitives suspect to having committed crimes in Hong Kong and 
Macau77. On the other hand, from the SARs side of the border, cooperation 
has also for long been ‘kind of’ alive.
76 In relation to Hong Kong, as part of the British Empire, the absence of a pre-
rogative power to extradite can be traced back to 1815. BRABYN, Janice, In-
ter-jurisdictional Co-operation in Criminal Matters cit. p. 135, n. 9. See also, 
on the Macau case, OLIVEIRA, Jorge Costa, Macau SAR Inter-Regional Mu-
tual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters, One Country, Two Systems, Three 
Legal Orders – Perspectives of Evolution. Essays on Macau’s Autonomy after the 
Resumption of Sovereignty by China, Springer- Verlag Berlin Heidelberg, 2009, 
p. 568 (“assistance that is not covered or foreseen by law is unlawful and 
therefore cannot be rendered”).
77 This apparent existence of a non-reciprocal relationship is officially alleged. 
The former Secretary for Justice in Hong Kong, Elsie Leung, reportedly af-
firmed that “[n]ormally, fugitive offenders will be sent back to Hong Kong 
but the practice is not reciprocated for mainland criminals”. LIM, C.L. & 
MUSHKAT, R., External Affairs cit., p. 115, n. 136. According to CHEUNG, 
Elsie, between 1990 and 1998, 128 fugitives were returned from the Main-
land. LO, Shiu Hing, The Politics of Cross-Border Crime in Greater China, 
p. 180. See also BRABYN, Janice M., Extradition and the Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region cit., p. 183-185, alluding to a case where the Mainland 
returned a fugitive to Macau. This informal co-operation based upon ‘tacit 
understandings’ was described in 1994 by Regina Yip, then Assistant Secre-
tary in Hong Kong, as follows: “[i]f we suppose there are [Hong Kong] crim-
inals in China, we send [the authorities] intelligence and information about 
them. We don’t ask for them back, though, because that would be extradition 
and Hong Kong would need a legal basis for it. [If the Chinese authorities 
found the Hong Kong criminals] they expelled them as ‘unwelcome persons’, 
which was not extradition”. BRABYN, Janice, Inter-jurisdictional Co-opera-
tion in Criminal Matters, cit. p. 157, 158. See also YEE, Marsha Wellknown, 
Hong Kong’s legal obligation to require fair trial for rendition cit., p. 1375, 
1376, informing that “[t]he polities currently have a one-way administrative 
arrangement through which the Mainland returns HKSAR residents to the 
HKSAR for investigation or trial if they are suspected of having committed 
offences solely in the HKSAR; the Mainland has not surrendered its own res-
idents to the HKSAR; [t]he HKSAR, in contrast, has not returned anyone 
to the Mainland because such an action “cannot be done in the absence of a 
formal arrangement which is supported by legislation’ ”.   
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Actually, provisions directly on point have existed in the past and 
they suggest a not very demanding kind of cooperation. In Hong Kong, 
some ordinances were enacted to give effect to Article IX of the 1843 
Supplementary Treaty of Bogue78, which provided that,
“[i]f lawless Natives of China, having committed crimes, or Of-
fences, against their own Government, shall flee to Hongkong or 
to the English Ships of War or English Merchant Ships for refuge; 
they shall, if discovered by the English Officers, be handed over 
once to the Chinese Officers for trial and punishment; or if, before 
such discovery be made by the English Officers, it should be ascer-
tained, or suspected, by the Officers of the Government of China 
whither such criminals and Offenders have fled, communication 
shall be made to the proper English Officer, in order that the said 
criminals and Offenders may be rigidly searched for, seized, and, 
on proof or admission, of their guilt, delivered up”79.
In Macau, centuries old seemingly unconditional and expedite 
practice received official stamp with the Treaty of Peking of 188780, 
which Article XLV provided in no uncertain terms that
“as to the surrender of Portuguese and Chinese criminals, with 
the exception of the Chinese criminals who take refuge in Macau 
78 On these ordinances, see BRABYN, Janice M., “Extradition and the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region”, cit., p. 183-85.
79 Treaty of the Bogue. Supplementary Treaty Signed By Their Excellencies Sir 
Henry Pottinger and Ki Ying Respectively, On The Part Of the Sovereigns 
of Great Britain and China, At the Bogue, 8th October 1843. As to British 
fugitives, the treaty provided that “[i]n like manner, if any Soldier or Sailor 
or other person, -  whatever his Caste or Country, - who is a Subject of the 
Crown of England, shall from any cause, or on any pretence, desert, fly, or 
escape into the Chinese Territory, such Soldier, or Sailor, or other person, 
shall be apprehended and confined by the Chinese Authorities, and sent to 
the nearest British Consular; or other Government Officer. In neither else 
shall concealment or refuge be afforded”.
80 The treaty was signed in 1 December 1887 and ratified in 28 April 1888. 
Treaty of Beijing, China-Port., Dec. 1, 1887, reprinted in Godfrey E.P. Hert-
slet, Treaties, Etc., between Great Britain and China and between China and 
Foreign Powers; and Orders in Council, Rules, Regulations, Acts of Parlia-
ment, Decrees, Etc., affecting British interests in China 422 (3d Ed. 1908).
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and for whose extradition the governor of Macau will continue 
to follow the practice thus far followed upon receiving a request of 
the Vice-King of the two Quangs, it is agreed that, in the Chinese 
ports that are open to foreign commerce, the Chinese criminals 
that take refuge in the dwellings or on board of ships of Portuguese 
subjects, will be arrested and surrendered to the Chinese authorities 
as soon as they so request to the Portuguese consul”81.
Irrespective of whether or not these provisions were commonly 
used and whether or not cooperation mostly escaped official channels, 
they lost their usefulness around seven decades ago due to the refusal 
by the PRC to take advantage of the “unequal treaties” or any related 
legislation82.
In fact, official relations between Hong Kong (Great Britain) and 
Macau (Portugal), on the one side, and the Mainland (China), on the 
other side, never proceeded without difficulty83. Thus, it is not a wild 
guess that for centuries cooperation on this matter has mainly consisted 
of in casu practical – non-official or quasi-official – responses that follow 
ad-hoc informal procedures and are conducted by the police and/or the 
prosecutorial authorities of the old, and now of the new, Hong Kong 
and Macau84.  Although the available data on this issue is minimal, some 
81 As to Portuguese fugitives, the treaty provides that “and, hence, also the Por-
tuguese criminals that take refuge in China will be arrested and surrendered to 
the Portuguese authorities as soon as they so request to the Chinese authorities, 
and no criminals shall be harbored by any of the parties and there will be no delay 
in their surrender” (emphasis added).
82 On the Chinese authorities’ reliance, prior to 1939, upon Hong Kong ordi-
nances on the surrender of Chinese citizens to the Mainland, see BRABYN, 
Janice M., Extradition and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region cit., 
p. 185, n. 92. On the “unequal treaties”, see WANG, Dong, China’s Unequal 
Treaties: Narrating National History, Lexington Books, 2005. 
83 On this, for Hong Kong, see WANG, Dong Wang, China’s Unequal Treaties: 
Narrating National History cit., and, for Macau, PEREIRA, Francisco, Portugal, 
China e a “Questão De Macau” cit.
84 Writing in 1988 Janice Brabyn considered that “it is possible that informal 
cooperation in the nature of disguised extradition on the part of Hong Kong 
may occur but the author has been unable to document this”. BRABYN, Jan-
ice M., Extradition and the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region cit., 
p. 183-85. Later on, the same author reported, in relation to Hong Kong, on: 
(1) “informal extradition of illegal immigrants, known or unknown fugitives 
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cases do come to public attention from time to time and enable us to 
have a glimpse on the nature of such long-standing de facto cooperation. 
This type of cooperation was always the natural consequence of the 
circumstance that, despite the fact that official ties with the Mainland 
have for centuries been under strain, Hong Kong and Macau were never 
truly separated from it, be it in a physical, economic, cultural, etc. sense85. 
This status quo has not impressively changed with the return of Hong 
Kong and Macau to the “embrace of the Mainland”.
Overall, on a pragmatic note, it is important to keep in mind 
that the peculiar kind of in casu practical responses and ad-hoc informal 
procedures that have long been used to handle the “surrender of fugitives 
to Mainland China issue” are nothing more than controversial devices 
deployed to overcome the absence of a general framework that is long due86.
amongst them”; (2) “escort of fugitives back to the mainland by PRC public 
security bureau personnel”; and (3) the possibility of “arrest and return to 
the PRC”. BRABYN, Janice, Extradition and the SARs After Reunification, 
Macau Law Journal, 2002, p. 82-86, also informing, in relation to Macau, on: 
(1) an “informal agreement as to extra-judicial surrender” between in the 
PRC and Macau; (2) a case where a foreigner was surrendered by the Macau 
police to the PRC authorities; (3) the circumstance that, since 1993, the PRC 
made five requests for surrender from Macau pursuant to the Portuguese Ex-
tradition Law of 1975. On formal surrender of fugitives from Hong Kong 
to Macau and “less formal co-operation between the authorities of the two 
jurisdictions [as] inevitable”, see Janice Brabyn, “Extradition and the SARs 
After Reunification”, p. 86. On “disguised extradition” which, at present, is 
possibly the most commonly used informal procedure ensuring that fugitives 
are surrendered to the Mainland, see below.
85 As Professor Zhao metaphorically explains, “the relationship between Hong 
Kong, Macau and the Mainland is as close as that of between the lip and the 
teeth and as interdependent as that of as between the flesh and the blood”. 
GUOQIANG, Zhao, “Auxílio judiciário mútuo inter-regional na China sob as 
condições de “um país, dois sistemas”, cit. p. 101.
86 This is one of those areas of law where the “normative force of constitutions” 
has to be confronted with the “normative force of facts” and, possibly, law 
is here “gravitating around itself”. CANOTILHO, Gomes, As Palavras e os 
Homens, reflexões sobre a Declaração Conjunta Luso-Chinesa e a institucio-
nalização do recurso de amparo de direitos e liberdades na ordem jurídica de 
Macau, Revista Jurídica de Macau, número especial sobre O Direito de Amparo 
em Macau e no Direito Comparado, 1999, p. 116. From both a political and 
constitutional/legal perspective, the status quo might be cause for concern 
but this is not the place carry an analysis from any of these perspectives. 
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In the new Hong Kong SAR, the “issue became a matter of 
controversy” soon after the handover, in 1998, when a Hong Kong resident 
was sentenced to death by a court in Guangzhou87 and executed by shooting 
on 5 December 1998 for crimes allegedly also committed in Hong Kong88. 
However, although controversy related to the possibility that crimes 
committed in Hong Kong could be punished in Mainland China, it was a 
clear case of concurrent jurisdiction and no surrender of fugitives issue 
was at stake89. Other cases that came to public attention, where crimes 
apparently perpetrated only in Hong Kong were prosecuted in Mainland 
China, occurred in 199990 and 200391. But again, no surrender of fugitives 
occurred in these cases. The controversial – but, in the opinion of the 
authors of this Article, rather unproblematic – legal issue in these cases 
only concerned the extra-territorial jurisdictional broad scope of the PRC’s 
Criminal Law, which purports itself to apply to Chinese citizens who 
commit crimes “outside the domain of the PRC”92. Although Hong Kong is 
Concerning the former for obvious reasons. The analysis of the latter re-
quires a longer engagement with the constitutional/legal norms applicable in 
each one of the SARs. It is not possible to undertake here such analysis, which 
can be found elsewhere. LEMOS, Miguel, Direitos Fundamentais e Processo 
Penal: o Habeas Corpus cit., p. 257-267. For the purposes of this Article, it 
is more adequate to provide the readers with an overview of the cases that 
came to public attention, the reaction of courts and academics and the rad-
ically opposing views on how the problem should be handled. This is done 
immediately below in the main text. 
87 Capital of Guangdong, the PRC’s province bordering the SARs. 
88 LIM, C.L. & MUSHKAT, R., External Affairs cit., p. 113, marg. 3088. See also 
CULLEN, Richard and FU, H.L., “Some Basic Limitations in the Basic Law 
Exposed”, China Perspectives, No 22 March-April 1999, p. 57, arguing that, in 
this case, there were “clear reasons” why the Hong Kong Government should 
have made a request for surrender of the fugitive through the informal “ad-
ministrative arrangements” that exist to move suspects across the border. 
89 On this case, see LO, Shiu Hing, The Politics of Cross-Border Crime in Greater 
China, p. 180-183. 
90 LO, Shiu Hing, The Politics of Cross-Border Crime in Greater China, p. 180-183.
91 Mainland, HK plan talks on extradition, China daily, 5 December 2003, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/05/content_287718.htm. 
92 See Article 7 PRC’s Criminal Law. On the controversial nature over the mean-
ing of the word “domain” used in Article 7 and the “proper demarcation of 
the scope of criminal jurisdiction of Hong Kong and China”, see LIM, C.L. & 
MUSHKAT, R., External Affairs cit., p. 113, 114, marg. 3093.  
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manifestly not outside the domain of the PRC93, there is no interpretation 
rule impeding Mainland courts to consider that the proper construction 
of such provision encompasses all places outside the territorial scope of 
the PRC criminal law, including Hong Kong and Macau94.
The only case in the new Hong Kong SAR that came to public 
attention, and where such informal and ad-hoc procedures were used, 
is the case of Zhou Yongjun, one of the students leaders of the 1989 
movement for democracy95. Apparently, he was surrendered by Hong 
Kong authorities to the Mainland authorities96 under what can be 
called a “disguised surrender”97. Subsequently, he was prosecuted 
93 Article 1 of the Basic Laws state that “The […] Special Administrative Re-
gion[s] [are] an inalienable part of the People’s Republic of China”.
94 In general, see also CULLEN, Richard and FU, H.L., “Some Basic Limitations 
in the Basic Law Exposed”, p. 54-56. Some national laws relating to “one 
country” issues are listed in Annex III of the Basic Law and are applied in the 
SARs by way of promulgation or legislation by the SARs themselves. The PRC 
Criminal Law is not one of such laws. The Nationality Law is. 
95 LIM, C.L. & MUSHKAT, R., External Affairs cit., p. 113, marg. 3091. 
96 The press realease of the Hong Kong Government on Zhou Yongjun’s case 
stated that “[w]e do not comment on individual cases. The Immigration De-
partment has the responsibility to uphold effective immigration control.  The 
department handles all entry applications in accordance with the law and 
immigration policy, having due regard to individual circumstances. In gener-
al, a passenger whose travel document does not meet the entry requirements 
will be repatriated to his or her place of embarkation or origin”. http://www.
info.gov.hk/gia/general/200910/12/P200910120217.htm (emphasis add-
ed). Subsequently, the Government denied knowingly handed over the dissi-
dent. https://www.scmp.com/article/705378/minister-denies-hk-knowing-
ly-handed-over-dissident. Under its immigration laws, the HKSAR may send 
back a Mainland resident who entered illegally or who entered legally but 
overstayed. Yee, Marsha Wellknown, Hong Kong’s legal obligation to require 
fair trial for rendition cit., n. 15. 
97 On this, see BRABYN, Janice M., Extradition and the Hong Kong Special Ad-
ministrative Region cit., p. 183-185, considering that “[n]ormally, deporta-
tion or expulsion is intended simply to remove a person from the territory of 
a particular state. Then a deporting state has little interest in the destination 
of the deportee, except to ensure that it is one by which the deportee will be 
accepted. Sometimes the prime concern is to return a person to a particu-
lar state for criminal prosecution and punishment with deportation merely 
being the method selected to achieve this end. This is really extradition in 
disguise, hence the common term ‘disguised extradition’”. BRABYN notes 
that “deportation does not become a disguised extradition simply because 
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in the Mainland98. But the most interesting event concerning this 
issue, and where an ‘unconditional and expedite’ kind of “disguised 
surrender” most probably occurred, relates with two 2007 and 2008 
interesting decisions of the Court of Final Appeal in Macau99. The 
issues in both decisions arise from two very similar situations. In both 
cases, Chinese citizens, permanent residents of the Hong Kong SAR, 
were arrested on arrival by ferry to the Hong Kong Maritime Ferry 
Terminal in Macau. Following the arrest, two habeas corpus requests 
were filed, in one case by the brother, in the other case by the sister, 
of the person under arrest. Moreover, in both cases the arrest related 
to crimes committed in the Mainland and an Interpol Red Notice100 
had been issued at the request of the Mainland authorities. Common 
to both cases is the existence of orders from an Adjunct Prosecutor 
“determining”, or “agreeing with”, the surrender of the person under 
arrest to the authorities of the Mainland. How the Macau CFA decided 
to tackle both cases was also similar. It relied on a provision of the 
Code of Criminal Procedure that, under the heading “surrender of 
the authorities of the state to which a deportee is sent are coincidentally 
anxious to prosecute or punish the deportee for a criminal offense. The term 
‘disguised extradition’ is only appropriate where achieving the function of 
extradition is one of the principal motivations for the deportation”. In effect, 
of relevance to this Article is only a forced deportation of a person through 
the border with the Mainland with the purpose of subjecting the person to 
criminal proceedings in the Mainland. It is not clear whether normally such 
‘disguised extradition’ occurs by means of direct surrender of the person 
by the Hong Kong or Macau polices to the Guangdong police or through 
an expulsion through the border while the Mainland authorities await on 
the other side for the person to enter Mainland jurisdiction. In Macau, di-
rect surrender might be the most common situation. See GUOQIANG, Zhao, 
Auxílio judiciário mútuo inter-regional na China sob as condições de “um 
país, dois sistemas” cit, p. 95, 101, describing a tacit agreement between 
the authorities of Macau and Guangdong on the surrender of fugitives from 
Macau back to the Mainland.
98 MACARTNEY, Jane (21 January 2010), Chinese democracy leader Zhou 
Yongjun jailed for fraud, The Times. 
99 Decisão Tribunal de Última Instância 12/2007, 20 Março; Decisão Tribunal 
de Última Instância 3/2008, 12 Fevereiro. 
100 A Red Notice is a request to law enforcement worldwide to locate and pro-
visionally arrest a person pending extradition, surrender, or similar legal ac-
tion. https://www.interpol.int/How-we-work/Notices/Red-Notices. 
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delinquents”, reads: “surrender of delinquents to another Territory 
or State is regulated by special law”101.
As the only special law existing on this matter is the 
abovementioned Law 6/2006, which only applies to states or territories 
outside the PRC, the court determined that, under the law, an arrest and 
surrender cannot occur. However, the facts on the ground got ahead of the 
Macau CFA. In the first case, the court ordered the release of the person 
under arrest. That is not what the court should have done. The court 
should have “ordered, by phone if necessary, the immediate presentation 
of the detainee”102. Arguably, if the Macau CFA had proceeded as the law 
mandates, it would have been able to prevent the de facto surrender of 
the person to the authorities of the Mainland, which was possibly taking 
place at the same time the court was delivering its decision. In the second 
case, a year later, by the time the Macau CFA was going to deliver its 
decision on the habeas corpus request, it had already been informed that 
the person under arrest had been surrendered to the Mainland under 
the order of an Adjunct Prosecutor, a high-rank prosecutorial authority, 
second only to the Prosecutor of the Macau SAR. Faced with a blatant 
non-compliance with its previous decision, the CFA uttered the following 
surprising words:
“that is, considering that this court had already ruled, by Judg-
ment of 20 March 2007, that it was unlawful to surrender the 
fugitive to the authorities of Mainland of China, [the Macau 
prosecutorial authorities] still persist in carrying out such 
surrender, with no law or agreement which provides for it, wi-
thout allowing the person under arrest to defend him/herself 
and without an order from a judge. These acts discredit Justice, 
undermine the rule of law and do not benefit the Macau Special 
Administrative Region”103.
101 Article 217 Criminal Procedure Code of Macau (emphasis added).
102 See Article 205 Criminal Procedure Code of Macau.
103 Unusually, the composition of the court in this second case did not include 
any Chinese judge. The three judges delivering the decision were all Portu-
guese nationals.
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The clash between the highest judiciary authorities of the Macau 
SAR is instructive. On the one side, the Macau CFA, emphasizing the 
rule of law, fundamental procedural rights and judicial supremacy, .i.e. 
Macau’s ‘second’ system. Indeed, the legal values underlying the decision 
of the court surely merit respect, but the ultimate result of such stance – 
the Macau SAR may surrender fugitives to the whole world, except to 
Mainland China and Hong Kong – is difficult to stomach. On the other 
side, the prosecutorial authorities, highlighting a view that gives prevalence 
to the need to cooperate with the Mainland in the fight against crime 
and, possibly, a prevalence of politics over law104. The need to effectively 
deal with criminality within “one country” surely also deserves respect, 
but a surrender decided by the prosecutorial/police authorities, without 
any substantive and procedural guarantees afforded to the person under 
arrest, is similarly hard to stomach.
conclusion
While third options were available105, what is more important to 
highlight in the conclusion of this Article is that this high level ‘judiciary 
clash’ is nothing but one extreme example of the difficulties, tensions or 
frictions inherent in attempts to find the proper operation of “one country, 
two systems”, an ingenious principle and idea and a multidimensional 
concept, which different layers, after two decades of implementation, 
are still unfolding.
104 On law and international law as an instrument of politics in China, see CHIU, 
Hungdah, Communist China’s Attitude Toward International Law, The Amer-
ican Journal of International Law, Vol. 60, No. 2 (Apr., 1966), p. 246-257. See 
also HUALING, Fu, XIAOBO Zhai, What makes the Chinese Constitution so-
cialist?, International Journal of Constitutional Law, Volume 16, Issue 2, (15 
June 2018), on what makes the PRC constitution a socialist constitution and 
the still, at present, dire state of constitutionalism in the Mainland.
105 See LEMOS, Miguel, Direitos Fundamentais e Processo Penal: o Habeas Cor-
pus cit., p.264-267, arguing that the general provisions of Criminal Proce-
dure Code of Macau provided sufficient grounds for the arrest of any fugi-
tive searched through the Interpol system and that an analogical use of the 
provisions on arrest and surrender of Law 6/2006 might provide sufficient a 
fortiori grounds for the arrest and surrender of a fugitive to Mainland China.  
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Eleventh hour information: in what might possibly be a curious 
twist to this Article, and its reliance on the absence of Mainland-SARs 
agreements on this issue, a new unfolding event is taking place as we 
wrap up. Energized by the impossibility of extraditing to Taiwan a Hong 
Kong resident suspect of having killed his girlfriend in Taiwan106, the 
Government of Hong Kong introduced a bill to the Legislative Council 
providing for the possibility of surrendering fugitives to Taiwan, the 
Mainland and Macau. If the bill passes, a new layer will be added to “one 
country, two systems” that might constitute a decisive step marking 
future cooperation on surrender of fugitives within “one country” for 
decades to come.
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